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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, as Adminis-

trator of the Estate of Nettie Nielson
Thorup, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
8691

vs.
EUGENE R. THORUP,
Defendant and Appellant,

IDA VIOLA THORUP LAYTON,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts
set forth in appellant's brief and in lieu thereof states the
facts as follows:
Respondent as administrator of the estate of Nettie
N. Thorup, deceased, filed its complaint against Eugene
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R. Thorup and Ida Viola Thorup Layton (R. 1, 2 and 3).
The complaint is one to quiet title and alleges plaintiff's
appointment as such administrator and that the said deceased, who died on February 23, 1955, was at the time of
her death the owner of the two parcels of realty described
in the complaint, that defendants are heirs at law of said
deceased, have no right, title or interest in said realty except as such heirs, and that plaintiff is entitled to the possession thereof and prays that title be quieted in plaintiff
as such representative of the estate of said deceased.
Defendant Eugene R. Thorup answered the complaint
admitting the date of death, the appointment of the
administrator, that he claims an interest in the property first described in the complaint and alleges that he is
the owner in fee thereof (R. 4) and by way of cross complaint, alleged, among other things, that on the 26th day
of July, 1950 said deceased duly executed and acknowledged
as grantor, a warranty deed by the terms of which said
defendant was named and designated as grantee, and conveying and warranting the property first described in
plaintiff's complaint and that after such execution and acknowledgment of said deed, the said grantor on said date
actually delivered said executed deed to said defendant (R.
5) which allegations plaintiff denied in its reply to such
cross complaint, admitting in said reply that said defendant had been in possession of said property since the death
of his mother, but only as caretaker for plaintiff (R. 7).
The purported deed to the defendant, Eugene R. Thorup,
was never recorded and was not in his possession at the
time of the trial (Exhibits 1 and 3 ; R. 5, and 13) .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
At the opening of the trial, plaintiff's attorney stated
that the issues involved were whether the two deeds under
which the respective defendants claimed title are forgeries
and whether they were delivered (R. 12) and were offered
by plainiff's counsel and received only for the purpose of
showing that the purported signatures of the grantor were
forgeries, which purported deeds, one marked Exhibit 1
from Nettie N. Thorup to Eugene R. Thorup covering the
property first described in plaintiff's complaint and one
marked Exhibit 2 from Nettie N. Thorup to Ida Viola
Thorup Layton to the property covered by the second description in plaintiff's complaint, and both purported deeds,
dated July 26, 1950, were also offered in evidence by counsel for defendants as evidence of title of the respective
defendants and were received in evidence by the court for
the purposes aforesaid (R. 13-14).
Louis H. Thorup, son of said deceased, then testified
that he was familiar with the signature of his mother (R.
18) and that her purported signatures on Exhibits 4, 5 (R.
19) 6, 7, 8 (R. 20) 9, 10 (R. 21) and 11 (R. 22) are her
signatures and that her purported signatures on Exhibits
1 and 2 are not her signatures (R. 34-35). (As some of
the exhibits are photostatic copies, we refer herein to signatures on exhibits as though they are all originals.)
W. Douglas Beatie, a member of the bar of this court,
testified that he performed the legal services in probating
the estate of the husband of said deceased (R. 44) during
1947 and 1948 (R. 45), saw Nettie N. Thorup sign documents incident to the probate of said estate, that she had
difficulty seeing although some of said instruments were
signed with and some without glasses and that her ten-
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dency was to get off the line in writing her signature (R.
46) . He testified that fr~m observing the signature of
Nettie N. Thorup, he was of the opinion that her purported
signature on Exhibit 14 is her signature (R. 47) and that
he saw her sign Exhibits 13 and 15 (R. 48-49).
J. Percy Goddard qualified as a handwriting expert and
testified that he had examined the purported signatures of
Nettie N. Thorup on Exhipits 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
13, 14 and 15 (R. 54) and assuming that all such purported
signatures on all such exhibits except 1 and 2 to be her
signature (R. 54), he was of the opinion that her purported
signatures on Exhibits 1 and 2 are very crude forgeries
(R. 55).
Defendant, Eugene R. Thorup, testified that he was
present on July 26, 1950 and saw his mother, Nettie N.
Thorup, sign the two deeds (Exhibits 1 and 2) in bright
daylight with her glasses on and that under instruction of
James M. Carlson, who was also present, she delivered the
deed, Exhibit 1, to said defendant (R. 86) and that James
M. Carlson notarized the deed and put stamps on it (R.
8 7) . On cross examination he testified that he signed as
a witness to the signature of his mother on the fifth line
under the heading Witness on Exhibit 14 (R. 87) and that
the signature of his mother thereon was one of her signatures ( R. 88) . He also testified on cross examination that
at the time his mother signed said deeds, Mr. Carlson sat
next to her (R. 91) and pointed out the line where she was
to sign, because his mother could hardly see the lines and
did not know where to sign (R. 92). Eugene R. Thorup
presumably sat on the other side of the table from his
mother and Mr. Carlson (R. 91).
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James M. Carlson testified to preparation of the deeds
after two interviews with Mrs. Nettie N. Thorup, who had
called him for the interviews. Also he testified she, Eugene
R. Thorup and he had together measured the property conveyed to Eugene on the second visit after examination of
abstracts delivered to him by Mrs. Thorup and on the date
the deeds bear, Mrs. Thorup called him and said to bring
the deeds in the daytime on a bright day and that on that
afternoon, she, in bright daylight with her glasses on, slowly
signed the two deeds and handed Eugene's to him after
acknowledgment as appears on the deed (R. 94-95). He
also testified that at that time Nettie N. Thorup also signed
the deed, Exhibit 2, and that he instructed her to give the
deed to Mrs. Layton who was not present and when asked
by Mr. Iverson as to whether Mrs. Thorup did anything
with it that he observed that night after he gave it to her,
he answered "No, I never heard of that any more until
we took a deposition in this case as to what happened

* * *"

(R. 96).

The trial court thereafter made and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 102-105) and its
decree (R. 106, 107, 108) finding the purported signatures
of Nettie N. Thorup to the two deeds, Exhibits 1 and 2, to
be forgeries and awarding judgment as prayed for in the
complaint.
Defendant Ida Viola Thorup Layton did not testify at
the trial, file a motion for a new trial, or appeal.
Defendant Eugene R. Thorup thereafter filed an affidavit of bias (R. 115) and a motion for new trial (R. 109)
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and in support thereof his affidavit (R. 113-114) in which,
among other things, he refers to numerous endorsements
by deceased on dividend checks near the date of the deeds
without describing them. At the hearing of the motion,
counsel for defendant, Eugene R. Thorup, presented to the
court twelve dividend checks of Utah Power & Light Company, payable to Nettie N. Thorup, which he had marked
Exhibit "A", which on request of counsel were filed with
the clerk. They were not admitted in evidence for any
purpose and there was no proof offered or taken with
respect to the genuineness of the endorsements.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF FORGERY.
POINT II
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM SURPRISE
FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN
EVIDENCE.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF FORGERY.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN NOT
REFERRING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL TO ANOTHER JUDGE.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF FORGERY.
Whether this case is denominated a "simple equity
case" or a "fraud law case to cancel deeds" as claimed by
appellant, is in our view immaterial. The complaint is in
the ordinary form for a quiet title action which, under
Section 78-40-1, U. C. A. 1953, may be brought against any
one "who claims an estate or interest in real property
* * * adverse to him, for the purpose of determining
such adverse claim". Clearly, the complaint states a claim
for relief under Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and even under the old procedure contains sufficient allegations as against a general demurrer. Gibson v. McGurrin,
37 Utah 158, 106 P. 669. Under such allegations, plaintiff
may prove that a deed or other instrument under which
defendant claims title or some interest in the property is
a forgery. 44 Am. Jur. 19, Quieting Title, Section 20; 74
C. J. S. 30, Quieting Title, Section 14; 78 A. L. R. 182-186.
Although we have found no Utah case specifically stating
this rule, plaintiff's right under a quiet title complaint to
attempt to prove that the deed under which defendant
claimed was void, was not questioned in two recent cases:
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Burnham v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P. 2d 96 and Bertoch
v. Gailey, 116 Utah 101, 208 P. 2d 953. Appellant cannot
deny that his claim to the property described in respondent's complaint is adverse to respondent and certainly
respondent is entitled to prove that such adverse claim is
based on a forged, and therefore void, instrument.
But even disregarding this rule, respondent was entitled to introduce evidence of forgery under the issues
joined to appellant's cross-complaint, wherein he specifically alleged title under a warranty deed allegedly executed
and delivered to him (R. 5), in reply to which respondent
denied the allegations of execution and delivery (R. 7).
If this case involved the avoidance of a deed because
of fraudulent misrepresentations by defendant or others,
appellant's citation to Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540, 140
P. 2d 386 might be apt and it is conceivable that in such
a case, this court might require a plaintiff to specifically
allege the fraud pursuant to Rule 9 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. But this is not such a case. Forgery, not fraud,
is the issue. Although both forgery and fraud are equally
opprobrious, the legal effect in the first case is that the
instrument is wholly void, whereas in the latter case the
instrument is usually only voidable. Compare 26 C. J. S.,
Deeds, Section 54 (g) with Section 56 and 16 Am. Jur.,
Deeds, Sec. 27 with Sec. 30. In the first case, the question
is whether the grantor in fact executed the instrument as
required by both the common law and statutes (Sec. 25-5-1
and 57-1-12, U. C. A. 1953) ; in the latter case the actual
signing by the grantor is assumed and the question is·
whether the grantor would have signed had he known the
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truth and had not relied on the fraudulent misrepresentation. See Cox v. Watkins, 149 Kan. 209, 87 P. 2d 243.
The suggestion that a quiet title action cannot be maintained when the plaintiff is not in possession is not the rule
in our state. Gibson v. McGurrin, supra; Worley v. Peterson, 80 Utah 27, 12 P. 2d 579.
POINT II
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM SURPRISE
FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN
EVIDENCE.
Appellant claims in his Point II that he was taken by
surprise by the introduction of certain checks in evidence,
presumably Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, and complains he had no
opportunity to present rebuttal testimony. Such a claim
is frivolous. No pleading may or should allege that a certain type of evidence will be relied on. Any _attorney can
be surprised by a given piece of evidence if he does not
properly prepare his case and does not use or even attempt
to use the available methods of discovery and pretrial. Respondent's denial of appellant's allegations of execution and
delivery of the questioned deed was before counsel, and
certainly by the time the deposition was taken "as to what
happened", as Mr. Carlson describes it in his testimony (R.
96), appellant was or should have been fully aware that
the signatures on the deeds were questioned and. that exemplars of decedent's signatures would be introduced at
the trial on the issue of forgery. Furthermore, appellant
made no objection to the introduction in evidence of Exhibits 9 and 10 (R. 21) and objected to Exhibit 11 only on
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the ground that the signatures on the checks were not
properly identified, which objection was properly overruled (R. 23) .
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF FORGERY.
The evidence is clear and convincing that the signature
on the questioned deed (Exhibit 1) was not the signature
of Nettie N. Thorup. No less than 18 exemplars of Mrs.
Thorup's handwriting were offered and received in evidence, for the most part without objection. That these
were her true signatures was not questioned at the trial
by appellant and is not questioned now except as to the
signatures on the two Utah Power & Light Company checks
(Exhibits 9 and 10). Indeed, the appellant identified his
mother's signature and his own signature as witness on
Exhibit 14 (R. 87-88).
A comparison of these exemplars with the signature
on Exhibit 1 demonstrates marked dissimilarities even to
non-experts in handwriting. As the trial judge pointed out
in his oral opinion at the conclusion of the trial (R. 98-99),
the questioned signature on Exhibit 1 is entirely dissimilar
to Mrs. Thorup's signature on Defendant's Exhibit 12 which
was made in 1927 and yet this 1927 signature has marked
similarities to the later examples of Mrs. Thorup's handwriting.
A comparison of the enlarged signature on Exhibit 1
(Exhibit la) with the enlarged signatures on Exhibits 7,
8, 9 and 10 (Exhibits 7a, Sa, 9a and lOa) shows even more

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

graphically the differences in handwriting. In addition to
the differences in the N's, T's, r's. and p's referred to at
some length in the examination and cross-examination of
Mr. Goddard, the court will note that the letters in the
signature on Exhibit 1 appear to be quite firmly written,
whereas the letters in the signatures on Exhibits 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 are shaky. There is, of course,
the very obvious difference that the questioned signature
is directly on the base line, while the signatures on all of
the exemplars, except Exhibit 12, wander either up or down
from a straight line. Note also the gaps between several
of the letters on Exhibit 1 which do not appear on the
exemplars.
Supplementing this evidence is the testimony of Louis,
one of Mrs. Thorup's sons, and the testimony of Percy
Goddard, a qualified handwriting expert, that the signature
on Exhibit 1 is not the signature of Mrs. Thorup or to use
Mr. Goddard's words, that the signatures on the questioned
deeds are "very crude forgeries" (R. 55).
Appellant's argument that respondent's sole proof of
forgery is the testimony of the expert, Mr. Goddard, ignores
the evidence of Louis Thorup and the very convincing evidence of the documents themselves. Furthermore, the statement that Mr. Goddard's opinion was based solely on the
two Utah Power & Light Company checks is incorrect. His
opinion was based on a comparison of all the exemplars,
except Exhibit 12, with the questioned signatures (R. 54),
and on cross-examination, he compared this 1927 Exhibit
12 with the questioned signatures and found several differences (R. 71).
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Admittedly the above evidence is in sharp conflict with
the evidence of the appellant and his counsel and the question becomes who and what to believe. In this respect, this
court must give great weight to the opinion of the trial
judge who heard the testimony and saw the witnesses.
Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 U. 2d 344, 294 P.
2d 689; Malstrom v. Consol. Theatres, 4 U. 2d 181, 290 P.
2d 689; Hatch v. W. S. Hatch Co., 3 U. 2d 295, 283 P. 2d
217; Cutler Assoc. v. DeJay Stores, Inc., 3 U. 2d 107, 279
P. 2d 700.
In considering the testimony of appellant and his counsel, the court should note the great detail testified to by
these witnesses more than six years after the event. The
sun was shining and they sat next to the window where it
was light (R. 88, 95). Mrs. Thorup signed the deed in their
presence without assistance (R. 77, 86, 90, 91, 95), except
that Mr. Carlson pointed out the line ( R. 95) and told her
to sign on the line (R. 90). She probably made the letters
of her signature separately as she was a little nervous (R.
90) . No explanation was offered as to why this nervousness did not make the letters at least as shaky as the letters
in the exemplars. Mrs. Thorup "couldn't hardly see the
lines" (R. 92), yet once Mr. Carlson pointed out the line
with his finger ( R. 95), she was able to see the line and
follow the line exactly without going up or down from the
line (see Exhibits 1 and. 1a). Mr. Carlson thought she
signed letter by letter (R. 95) and Eugene Thorup thought
she probably stopped writing between some of the letters
(R. 90). It took her quite a while to sign the deeds although
she was "feeling good that day and the light was shining
on the table" (R. 89-90). Immediately after it was signed,
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Mr. Carlson signed as witness and notary public and
affixed his notarial seal and documentary stamps (R. 77,
95). He then handed the deeds back to Mrs. Thorup,
prompting her with respect to the delivery requirement.
She then handed Exhibit 1 to Eugene (R. 77, 95). All of
this took place around the dining room table (R. 88, 95)
or kitchen table (R. 91) "where it was nice and light and
the sun was shining through the window" (R. 88).
The suggestion in appellant's brief at page 9 that there
is a presumption that the deed was regular because of
appellant's possession of the property has no application
to the facts here, although it might be pertinent in a case
where only a question of delivery is involved. Appellant
and his mother lived together on the property in question
both before and after the date of the purported deed (R.
76). In any event, such a presumption, if it exists at all,
has been overcome by the evidence that the deed was not
regular.
Appellant's contention at page 12 of his brief that in
order to prove forgery plaintiff must prove that the deed
was signed without the authority of the grantor is not the
law. No suggestion was made in the pleadings or at the trial
that Mrs. Thorup authorized appellant or anyone else to
sign her name to Exhibit 1. If respondent had to show
that the signature was not signed by authority of Mrs.
Thorup, it would be required not only to prove a negative,
but would have the impossible task of proving that the
deceased grantor, whose testimony is no longer available,
at no time during her life and particularly on July 26, 1950,
did not authorize either orally or in writing any person,
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whether a relative, friend, stranger or one of the defendants, to sign her name to Exhibit 1. In addition to these
absurdities, such a rule would reduce the Statute of Frauds
to an empty shell. It is significant that of the cases cited
by appe1lant for this proposition (insofar as the same can
be checked from the citations given), all were criminal
cases where the defendant's liberty was at stake and the
prosecution was required to prove forgery beyond a reasonable doubt and all involved a factual situation where the
evidence indicated an authorization for the asserted forgery
might have been given.
The rules cited by appellant at page 12 of his brief
that a grantor need not sign a deed if he adopts the signature or acknowledges the signature as his own has no application to the facts of this case. There was no suggestion
in the pleadings or at the trial that Mrs. Thorup at any
time adopted someone elses signature and appellant's own
evidence was that Mrs. Thorup signed the deed herself and
at the same time acknowledged it before a notary public.
The execution by Mrs. Thorup and the acknowledgment
were contemporaneous events according to appellant's evidence and if the judge disbelieved that Mrs. Thorup executed Exhibit 1, the judge was also entitled to disbelieve the
testimony that she acknowledged the signature on Exhibit
1 before a notary public. In a case somewhat similar to
the case at bar in that the trial judge did not believe the
testimony of witnesses who stated they were present when
a grantor purportedly executed and acknowledged a deed,
the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
"In the case at bar, the evidence as to both the
execution and acknowledgment of the alleged deed
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is so interwoven, it cannot be separated or considered
independently. It may not be, for, under the peculiar
circumstances here, we may well conclude that falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus."

Slusher v. Locke, (Ky.) 243 S. W. 2d 649. See also Conly
v. Coburn, 297 Ky. 292, 179 S. W. 2d 668.
POINT IV

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN NOT
REFERRING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL TO ANOTHER JUDGE.
Rule 63 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under which
appellant filed his affidavit claiming that the Honorable
Ray Van Cott, Jr., District Judge, was biased and prej udiced toward appellant and his counsel, does not, we contend,
apply to motions for new trial. The rule in terms relates
only to actions or proceedings "to be tried or heard". Here
the case had already been tried anc;l heard when the affidavit was filed and the judge had made his oral decision
and signed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment.
We point out that the filing of this affidavit smacks
somewhat of the maneuver referred to by this court in
Meagher v. Equity Oil Company, 5 U. 2d 196 at 201, 299
P. 2d 827.
Without going into the sufficiency of the affidavit
which, the court will note, is based only on information and
belief (R. 115), the refusal of the trial judge to certify
the motion for new trial to another judge was not prej udi-
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cial. If another judge had heard the motion, he would have
decided whether to grant or deny the motion on the basis
of the written record. This court is in the same position
as such a judge for it too must decide whether a new trial
should be granted on the basis of the same written record.
POINT V
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENYlNG APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
I

Of the grounds relied on by appellant in his Motion
for New Trial (R. 109) we have discussed grounds 1, 3
and 4 in our Points II, III and I, respectively. The second
ground for new trial was newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses who would relate
certain statements made by Mrs. Thorup prior to her death
(R. 111, 112) and twelve Utah Power & Light Co. checks
(Defendant's Exhibit A) the endorsements on which were
assertedly made by Mrs. Thorup and resemble the signature
on Exhibit 1.
There is no showing why the two witnesses were not
produced at the trial but in any event their testimony was
merely cumulative to that given by Merle Hinds (R. 40-43).
The testimony of such witnesses that Mrs. Thorup wanted
to give or had given the property to the appellant and that
she wanted him to have the house is of little value. None
of these statements indicate that Mrs. Thorup signed the
deed in question. For all we know, she may have believed
the mere intention to pass title was sufficient without the
execution of a deed or will.
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The twelve checks were never offered or received in
evidence and thus the endorsements have never been properly identified as the signature of Mrs. Thorup. But assuming Mrs. Thorup did sign all or some of the checks, a comparison of such signatures with the signature on Exhibit 1
shows many different characteristics.

CONCLUSION
While we acknowledge the severe burden of proof on
plaintiff, we respectfully submit that the burden has been
sustained and that the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ATHOL RAWLINS,
H. R. WALDO, JR.,
of RAY, RAWLINS, JONES
& HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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